Can Poland become a technology player in Europe? Between ambition, security and scaling up

That was the subject of the podcast Kwestia Sporna w Jedynce, where the discussion went far beyond artificial intelligence as a buzzword and touched on a fundamental question: what place can Poland take in the global technology race?

In Maciej Kawecki’s view, the global technology hierarchy has already taken shape. In civilian artificial intelligence the US holds first place, with China ever more confidently taking second. It is between the two of them that the battle is being fought for control over the algorithms that will shape everyday life, from services to robotic systems.

By this logic, Kawecki says, there is almost no room left for a “third global player”. So the question should be framed differently: not whether Poland can be a world technology power, but whether Europe as a whole can build up strength of its own — and what role Poland can play in that.

Aleksander Poniewierski takes an even broader view. Reducing modern technology to artificial intelligence alone is a strategic mistake. Historically, all the great technological breakthroughs have come from one of two sources: military necessity or an existential threat.

The examples are obvious. Ukraine built a drone ecosystem in a short time because it had no alternative. South Korea and Israel invested in technology for decades because it was a matter of survival. In such conditions technology is not a fashion but a response to a clearly defined need.

Hence the logical question: can Poland, which is not in a full-scale war but is aware of the security risks, create technological niches of its own — not global, but critically important?

The discussion about drones turned into a vivid illustration of systemic weaknesses. Kawecki stresses that even Ukraine, which produces thousands of drones a day, is not a “drone power” in the global sense. China is: it has created entire industrial zones and state strategies for the mass production of UAVs.

Poland’s problem, in his view, is not volume but the lack of a mechanism. Today the country effectively has no coherent drone market: it is fragmented, riven by internal conflict and dependent on imports. Public procurement drags on for months, and the security clauses that allow Chinese manufacturers to be restricted are hardly ever applied.

The point is not to start producing thousands of drones immediately but to have a system that can be quickly “switched on” in the event of a threat. By Kawecki’s estimate, 0.25% of the defence ministry’s budget would be enough to lay the foundations of such a sector.

In a broader sense, drones are just an example. The real question is how a state can create competitive advantages in selected fields. The experience of other countries shows that technological strength does not necessarily mean global dominance. It can be focused, niche and yet critically important.

That requires a scaling mechanism. First come the specialists, then the engineers and leaders who turn knowledge into a repeatable product, and finally the entrepreneurs capable of owning a business, not just working in one. Without this, technology does not become an economy.

Poniewierski compares Poland to a good restaurant with just a few tables: high quality, but not scalable. To grow, the state needs to take three steps: set priorities, abandon directions that are bound to fail, and understand the logic of growth.

A separate part of the discussion concerned education and talent. Kawecki speaks of the need for openness: Poland must learn to attract talent stronger than its own, using its economic and geopolitical brand. Western universities teach not only knowledge but also how to do business — and that is what Poland lacks here and now.

At the same time, Poles moving abroad is not a problem in itself. The problem is the lack of conditions for them to come back. The ideal model is the “boomerang”: people gain experience, networks and capital abroad, and then return or invest in their home country.

In a globalised world, a company’s nationality is losing its clear outlines. What matters is not so much where it is registered as whether its success works for the country — through investment, knowledge and human capital.

The conversation offered no simple answers, but it clearly set out the framework: Poland is unlikely to become a global technology power, the discussion concluded, but it may well become a strong, independent and indispensable player in selected fields within Europe. That requires not just money or technology but, above all, a clear strategy, scaling mechanisms and work with people.

It is with discussions like this that the road from ambition to real competitive advantage begins.

Author

Dr. Myroslav Trofymuk

Born in Lviv. Designer, director, musician, researcher, founder of ZEMLA STUDIO. Master of classical philology and digital marketing, PhD in the history of Ukrainian literature. Member of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine. Since 2022 he has authored the CENTRUM MUNDI audio show for Polish Radio for Ukraine, continuing the same research into the contemporary music scene in Ukraine and Poland.

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